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Abstract—We present ProPoS, a Proof-of-Stake protocol ded-
icated, but not limited, to cryptocurrencies. ProPoS is a
chain-based protocol that minimizes interactions between nodes
through lightweight committee voting, resulting in a more simple,
robust, and scalable proposal than competing systems. It also
mitigates other drawbacks of previous systems, such as high
reward variance and long confirmation times. ProPoS can sup-
port large node numbers by design, and provides probabilistic
safety guarantees whereby a client makes commit decisions by
calculating the probability that a transaction is reverted based
on its blockchain view. We present a thorough analysis of ProPoS
and report on its implementation and evaluation. Furthermore,
our new technique of proving safety can be applied more broadly
to other Proof-of-Stake protocols.
I. INTRODUCTION
One of the main innovations of Bitcoin [36] is Nakamoto
Consensus (NC), a protocol for maintaining a distributed data
structure called a blockchain. In NC, each participating node
tries to become the round leader by solving a Proof of Work
(PoW) puzzle. If a solution is found, the node announces
a block that contains a hash link to the previous block,
the solution of the PoW puzzle, transactions, and metadata.
Potential network forks are resolved by following the longest-
chain rule. In this non-interactive leader election process, a
block produced in a round acts as the medium of transactions,
the leader election proof (easily verifiable by other nodes),
and as confirmation of all previous blocks. Hence, confidence
in a given chain is built gradually through the addition of
new blocks. The protocol can scale to a number of nodes
that is vastly too large to be handled by traditional Byzantine
Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocols [16], which in every
round require significant communication complexity among
all nodes. However, NC has some critical limitations, such
as its enormous energy footprint, its low throughput, and a
slow and insecure finalization process – furthermore, its reward
frequency and structure encourage centralization, which in turn
amplifies its security vulnerabilities [9], [17], [26].
A promising direction in the mitigation of (some of) these
drawbacks involves Proof-of-Stake (PoS) protocols, in which
nodes do not vote via their computing power, but with their
stake, i.e., blockchain tokens. A new node needs to obtain
stake from the existing nodes; however, for the price of such
a semi-permissionless setting, these systems promise multiple
benefits. These benefits include reduced energy consumption,
as voting is usually based on a cryptographic lottery that relies
on short messages instead of resource-intensive PoW puzzles.
Furthermore, the transaction throughput can be improved by
sequential processing and block propagation at the network
rate. Interestingly, as participating nodes and their stake are
known upfront, these systems promise to commit blocks faster
and with better safety properties, similar to the properties of
standard BFT protocols. However, there are many obstacles
in the design of new PoS schemes. Several recent systems
try to apply the longest-chain rule in the PoS setting. Unfor-
tunately, those proposals mimic Nakamoto’s design decisions
that introduce undesired effects such as a high reward variance
which leads to centralization [23]. Moreover, although they
are conceptually similar to NC, whose properties have been
investigated in the literature, it has proven challenging to
replace PoW-based voting by cryptographic primitives while
avoiding fundamental limitations [12]. For instance, unlike
NC, where it is expensive to work on solving PoW puzzles
on two branches simultaneously (as the node will eventually
lose its investment on one branch), it is easy in PoS systems
to vote on multiple conflicting branches. This is informally
known as the nothing-at-stake problem. Similarly, it is easier
to launch long-range attacks in the PoS setting, in which an
adversary obtains keys of nodes who controlled a majority of
stake in the distant past and creates a long alternative chain.
In this work, we present ProPoS, a PoS protocol that
addresses the above limitations while remaining conceptually
simple and free from BFT-like message complexity. In our
protocol, committee members are randomly and periodically
sampled to vote for their preferred main chain views. Evidence
for these votes is included in the blocks, and they users to
make their own decisions about whether to commit/finalize a
block, and therefore act on the transaction in the block (e.g.,
dispatching package based on a cryptocurrency transaction).
In particular, clients calculate the probability that the block
can be reverted given how many votes support the block and
its descendants, and commit the block if this probability is
low enough. By reducing the degree of interaction between
committee members, ProPoS can scale to large numbers of
active participants. This is combined with a high frequency of
blocks and rewards for participating nodes, which mitigates the
tendency towards centralization of NC. ProPoS introduces a
chain selection algorithm that aims to gather as much informa-
tion as possible about the nodes’ views, which leads to higher
security and faster commit decisions. The CAP theorem [11]
restricts distributed systems to select either availability or
consistency in the face of network partitions. ProPoS favors
availability over consistency; however, in ProPoS partitioned
clients would notice that their view of the blockchain does
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not provide strong safety guarantees for their commit de-
cisions (we propose a novel use of hypothesis testing to
analyze it). ProPoS is presented with a fair and coalition-
safe rewarding scheme, sadly omitted by many competing
systems. We emphasize the impact of the major design choices
in ProPoS through a detailed comparison to Algorand [27],
which is a closely related PoS protocol. Whereas Algorand’s
BFT-like block commitment scheme focuses on individual
rounds, ProPoS aggregates information from multiple rounds
and hence achieves higher security and flexibility in the sense
that each user is able to set her own security thresholds.
We thoroughly analyze our system, present the efficiency
and deployability of ProPoS through an implementation, and
discuss alternative design choices and extensions.
II. SYSTEM MODEL
Participants and Network. Our system comsists of multiple
peer nodes who want to achieve consensus over the state of
a distributed ledger. The nodes are mutually untrusting with
exactly the same rights and functions (i.e., no node or any
subset is trusted). Nodes are identified by their unique public
keys, and to avoid Sybil attacks [20] we assume that nodes
require stake in terms of the underlying cryptocurrency to
participate. The initial set of nodes and their stake allocation
is pre-defined in a genesis block that is known to all nodes
(i.e., the system is bootstrapped from the genesis block). The
stake distribution is represented by a mapping between public
keys and their corresponding stake units. The system is used
by clients who wish to make cryptocurrency transactions and
who do not necessarily participate in the consensus protocol
(although some may).
We assume that participating nodes have loosely synchro-
nized clocks, as the protocol makes progress in timed rounds.
Nodes are connected via a peer-to-peer network in which mes-
sages are delivered within ∆ seconds during periods of network
synchrony. We assume a partially synchronous communication
model [21], where the network can be asynchronous with
random network delays, but synchrony is eventually resumed
after an unknown time period called global stabilization time
(GST). We assume that during asynchronous periods, an
adversary cannot adaptively control network splits and delays,
although the adversary can be omnipresent in all existing
splits. We emphasize that similar or stronger assumptions are
common among competing systems.
Desired Properties. First, we desire the two following fun-
damental properties. Liveness: a valid transaction sent to the
network is eventually added to the global ledger and commit-
ted by all clients. Probabilistic Safety: if for a client-specified
probability p∗ ∈ [0,1), the client commits a transaction, then
the probability that this transaction is ever reverted is at most
p∗. One important aspect of ProPoS is that, unlike in tradi-
tional BFT protocols, our definition of safety is probabilistic.
The relaxed safety property allows us to scale the system to
thousands of active participants and to propose a simple, ro-
bust, and high-throughput system, while still achieving strong
client- or even transaction-specific safety.
Besides these properties, we present our work in an open
cryptocurrency setting – therefore, we aim to achieve the
following additional properties. Scalability: the system should
scale to a large number of nodes. High Throughput: the system
should provide high throughput for transactions, and in partic-
ular, the consensus mechanism should not be a bottleneck for
this throughput. Efficiency: overheads introduced by the system
should be reasonable, allowing system deployment on the
Internet as it is today, without requiring powerful equipment
or resources (like CPU, memory, and bandwidth). Fairness:
an honest node with a fraction α of the total stake, should
have a presence of approximately α in the main chain of the
blockchain. This is especially important when the presence
in the blockchain is translated into system rewards. Coalition
Safety: any coalition of nodes with the total stake α = ∑αi,
where αi is a coalition node’s stake, cannot obtain more than
a multiplicative factor (1+ε)α of the total system rewards for
some small ε .
Cryptography. We make standard cryptographic assumptions
and we use the following cryptographic constructions. H(m)
is a collision-resistant cryptographic hash function, producing
a hash value for a message m; PRFk(m) is a keyed pseu-
dorandom function (PRF), outputting a pseudorandom string
for key and message pair; Signsk(m) is a signature scheme
that for a secret key sk and a message m produces the
corresponding signature σ ; VrfySignpk(m,σ) is a signature
verification procedure that returns True if σ is the correct
signature of m under the secret key corresponding to the public
key pk, and False otherwise.
Adversary. We assume an adversary who is able to control
nodes possessing M = f S “malicious” stake units, for any f <
1
3 and where S denotes the total number of stake units; hence,
honest nodes possess (1− f )S stake units. Adversarial nodes
can be byzantine, i.e., they can fail or equivocate messages
at the adversary’s will. (We emphasize that f < 13 is a bound
in both our adversary and network models [21].) We assume
that the adversary’s goal is to violate the liveness and/or
probabilistic safety properties, by a) stopping the progress of
the protocol, or b) by causing a non-compromised client to
commit a transaction that can be reverted with a probability
that is higher than specified by the client. We also discuss
adversarial strategies that aim to undermine other protocol
properties (such as efficiency, throughput, and fairness).
III. PROTOCOL
A. Preliminaries
For each node we have a secret/public key pair sk, pk as well
as the amount of associated stake. For simplicity, we assume
that the nodes’ stakes are natural numbers that sum to the
total stake S. ProPoS operates through a blockchain, such that
each block contains a set of transactions, a link to the previous
block, and various metadata. The structure of a block is
B = (i,ri,H(B−1),F,V,Txs, pk,σ), (1)
where i is the round number (consecutive, starting from 0); ri is
a random value generated by the leader; H(B−1) is the hash of
the previous valid block, blocks thus encode the parent-child
relationship; V is a set of votes that support the previous block
(see Eq. 2); F is a set of known, to the leader, forked blocks
that have not been reported in any previous known block; Txs
is a set of transactions included in the block; pk is the leader’s
public key; σ is a signature, created by the block leader over
all previous fields except pk.
Every block supports its previous block by encoding votes
of (elected in the round) nodes who vouched for the previous
block as their preferred (main) chain of the blockchain. A vote
has the following structure:
v = (i,H(B−1),s, pk,σ), (2)
where i is the round number; H(B−1) is the hash of the
previous valid block; s is the stake that the vote creator was
elected with as a voter for the round i; pk is the voter’s public
key; σ is a signature, created by the voter over all previous
fields except pk. Essentially, a vote encodes a stake unit with
which the voter supports her blockchain view in a given round.
As our blockchain contains blocks that follow a parent-
child relation and as it may contain forks, in essence, the
final rendered data structure is a directed acyclic graph (DAG)
or a tree (see an example in Fig. 2). However, within this
DAG only one chain is considered as the main chain whose
transactions are strictly ordered. Transactions are initiated by
blockchain clients who wish to transfer their crypto tokens or
execute a higher-level logic (like smart contracts). We assume
that transactions are accompanied by fees paid for appending
them to the blockchain. We do not introduce any transaction
model or a validation logic for transactions, although models
used in other systems can easily be implemented with ProPoS.
B. Voting Round
The protocol bootstraps from the genesis block and makes
progress in two-step rounds. The voting procedure of every
round is presented in Alg. 1. Each round lasts for 2∆ seconds
and has two steps (∆ for each step). At the beginning of
every round i, each node obtains a round’s pseudorandom
beacon r used to elect the voters and a leader. In § III-F we
show concrete instantiations of beacon generation and discuss
alternative ways of realizing it.
In the first step of the round, a node checks whether she
can vote in this round by calling VoterStake() which returns
the number of stake units that the node can use to vote in the
round. If a positive number is returned, then the node in that
round is called a voter and can vote for (i.e., support) the last
block of the main chain (from the node’s perspective). To do
so, the voter creates a vote v (see Eq. 2) and broadcasts the
vote immediately to the network to signal what chain the node
supports. Other nodes validate all received votes by checking
whether a) it is authentic, formatted correctly, and not from
the future (i.e., not with a future round number), b) it points to
some previous block (note that in ProPoS forks are allowed),
c) the voter is legitimate (i.e., VoterStake() returns the positive
stake amount as declared). After a successful verification, a
vote is added to the pending list of votes directly supporting
the last block. These votes create a so-called virtual block
Alg. 1: The voting procedure.
1 function VotingRound(i)
2 r← RoundBeacon(i); s←VoterStake(pk,r);
3 if s > 0 then // check if I’m a voter
4 B−1←MainChain().lastBlk; // get last block
5 σ ← Signsk(i‖H(B−1)‖s);
6 v← (i,H(B−1),s, pk,σ); // support vote
7 Broadcast(v);
8 Wait(∆); // meanwhile, collect and verify support votes
9 if LeaderStake(pk,r)> 0 then // check if I am a leader
10 B−1←MainChain().lastBlk; // possibly different block
11 V ←{va,vb,vc, ...}; // received B−1’s support votes
12 ri← Random(); σ ← Signsk(i‖ri‖H(B−1)‖F‖V‖Txs);
13 B← (i,ri,H(B−1),F,V,Txs, pk,σ); // new block
14 Broadcast(B);
15 Wait(∆); // wait for the next round
which contains votes that have been collected but not yet
included, and one virtual block can support another virtual
block (we discuss this further in § III-D).
After waiting for ∆ seconds1, collecting and validating
broadcast votes, the second step of the round starts. Ana-
logously, the node checks the output of the LeaderStake()
function, and if it is positive then the node is a leader of that
round. The node determines the main chain again. Importantly,
received votes can change the main chain selected in the
previous step – see the details in § III-D. Next, the node
creates and propagates a new block including, among other
fields – see Eq. 1 – all collected votes and the generated
random value ri. A node receiving a new block verifies if
a) it is authentic, formatted correctly, and not from the future,
b) it points to some existing block, c) the votes are correct,
and d) the leader is legitimate (i.e., LeaderStake() returns a
positive value). If the block is validated, it is appended to its
corresponding chain. Besides pointing to the previous block, a
leader in its block lists all known forks that were not reported
in previous blocks (including pending votes of other blocks).
For now we abstract from the actual implementation of
leader and voter election, and propose a concrete instantiation
in § III-C. However, one requirement of these procedures is
that nodes will act as leaders and voters in proportion to
their stake possession. Technically, the only reason to have
a leader election is to propose blocks and make progress in
the protocol. We do not restrict the roles of a node per round,
i.e., a node can both be a voter and leader in a given round,
or act in only one of these roles, or none.
C. Leaders and Voters Election
We propose a method of electing leaders and voters which
is based on cryptographic sampling presented in Alg. 2. The
core of this method is to create an array of all stake units
and pseudorandomly sample a fraction from it. The method
uses uniquely generated PRF outputs to sample stake units.2
In a round, leader and voter elections should be independent,
thus the Sample() function takes a role parameter (‘lead’ and
1For a simple description, we avoid message generation and processing
time and rely on the ∆ parameter for expressing all delays.
2The construction can be optimized using consecutive dlog2(S)e bits of
every PRF output, as usually, PRF outputs n bits where S≪ 2n.
Alg. 2: Leader/voter election via cryptographic sampling.
1 function VoterStake(pk, r)
2 tmp← Sample(Q,r, ‘vote’); return tmp.Count(pk);
3 function LeaderStake(pk, r)
4 tmp← Sample(L,r, ‘lead’); return tmp.Count(pk);
5 function Sample(size, r, role)
6 tmp← []; res← [];
7 for pk ∈ stake do
8 for s ∈ {1, ...,stake[pk]} do
9 tmp.Append(pk);
10 for i ∈ {1, ...,size} do
11 n← PRFr(i‖role) % Length(tmp);
12 res.Append(tmp[n]); tmp.Delete(n);
13 return res;
‘vote’, respectively) to randomize PRF outputs for these two
elections. The function returns a list of sampled public keys
(each key corresponds to a stake unit) and is parametrized by
the parameter determining the size of the list. Q denotes how
many stake units out of the total stake S are elected every round
for the voting committee, and L is an analogous parameter for
leaders. The VoterStake() and LeaderStake() functions run
Sample() and return how many times the given public key
is present in the sampled stake. In App. A, we show that
our construction is indistinguishable from random sampling
for computationally bounded adversaries. As stake units are
sampled uniformly at random, a node with stake s can be
elected as a voter between 0 and s times in any given round.
For performance reasons it may be desirable for one leader to
be elected every round, which is achieved by setting L = 1.
This approach guarantees that in every round the exact same
stake fraction is sampled. As a result, clients are able to more
quickly make commit decisions. However, a disadvantage is
that an adversary may try to launch an adaptive attack (e.g.,
(D)DoS) as elected nodes are known before they broadcast
their messages. We discuss ways of mitigating such attacks in
App. E-B; however, other election approaches that eliminate
this threat can easily be adopted in ProPoS. One way of
addressing this issue in PoS blockchains is to use crypto-
graphic primitives with secret inputs (e.g., VRF or unique
signatures). When such an approach is applied, a node’s role
can be revealed only by this node itself, e.g., by propagating
a message. The disadvantage, as we show in § VI-B and
App. E-E, is the variance in the number of elected entities
(i.e., the number of leaders and voters in every round is only
on average equal to L and Q, respectively). In App. E-E, we
show how ProPoS can be combined with VRF-based election
and how our analysis results are applicable for this case.
An efficient mechanism that combines “secret” election with
guaranteed committee sizes is an open research problem.
D. Chain Selection
Our chain selection procedure is inspired by two PoW
systems. For expressing the strength of blocks and we use
a similar approach as in recently-proposed StrongChain [42],
where blocks contain multiple (relaxed) PoW solutions to
express the network’s combined PoW. To improve the handling
of forks, we use the GHOST protocol [40], proposed to
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…
Fig. 1: An example of a virtual block fork.
improve the throughput and security of Nakamoto consensus
by increasing the block frequency and utilizing fork blocks in
the calculation of the total PoW weight of chains.
Single Forks and Virtual Blocks. In ProPoS, votes contribute
to “weights” of chains and are crucial in the determination of
the main branch. In short, they represent beliefs of stakehold-
ers about their views of the main chain. For single forks, nodes
follow the most-stake rule, i.e., the chain which is supported
by more stake-weighted votes is chosen. ProPoS allows for
no block to be added in a round (e.g., when a faulty node
is elected as a leader or when the network is temporarily
asynchronous) or a block that contains few or no votes. In such
a case, nodes create a virtual block (see § III-B) which is a set
of received votes that has not been included in the blockchain
yet (virtual blocks do not have transactions or signatures,
unlike ‘standard’ blocks). In the chain selection, nodes do
not distinguish virtual from “standard” blocks and if a virtual
block is stronger than some concurrent standard block, a voter
will vote for the virtual block (indicating the latest standard
block on the main chain as the previous one). A leader who
does not include votes in her block may expect that the block
will be overwritten by another leader aggregating these non-
included votes present temporarily in virtual block(s).
An example is presented in Fig. 1, where Q/S = 10% and
voters in round i publish seven votes supporting the block
Bi−1. The leader of round i creates a block Bi which includes
only three votes with 4% of the stake. Therefore, a virtual
block B′i with 6% stake is created and in round i+1 all votes
implicitly support this block (instead of Bi), thus the leader
of this round creates a block Bi+1 that aggregates votes of the
virtual block and pointing to Bi−1. (We emphasize that the
block Bi+1 includes also a pointer to Bi cf. GHOST.)
Extension to Subtree Selection. When the network is syn-
chronous (and ∆ is long) the proposed rule is likely to work
well. But to achieve high throughput, the block delivery
intervals have to be relatively short. This, combined with our
Internet setting, would inevitably lead to asynchronous periods
when blocks cannot reach nodes within the defined timeouts.
Such a situation would result in a high stale block ratio that
would inevitably decrease the security of the strongest chain.
In order to prepare the protocol to withstand such situations,
we modify and extend GHOST to adapt it to our setting. The
chain selection procedure is depicted in Alg. 3. As presented,
the MainChain procedure starts at the genesis block. Then
for each of its children blocks, the algorithm calculates the
total stake (i.e., the votes associated with the given branch)
of a child block’s subtree, and repeats this procedure for the
child block with the most stake aggregated on its subtree,
Alg. 3: The chain selection procedure.
1 function MainChain()
2 best← (.lastBlk← B0, .stake← Stake(B0));
3 while True do
4 if Children(best.lastBlk) = /0 then
5 return best;
6 for B ∈Children(best.lastBlk) do
7 s← TreeStake(B);
8 if s > best.stake then
9 best← (B,s); // stronger subtree found
10 function TreeStake(root)
11 s← 0;
12 for B ∈ TreeBlocks(root) do
13 s← s+Stake(B); // add stake directly supporting B
14 return s;
Blockchain view of E’s leader (in round i) Blockchain view of F’s leader (in round i+1)
F 8%A 9% C 3% D 4% E 4%
J 2%
N 4% P 3%
prev: D
leader: pk
votes: <4%>
forks: G, J, P
 …
transactions
B 3%
M 4%
H 1%
G 2%
A 9% C 3% D 4%
J 2%
N 4% P 3%
B 3%
M 4%
H 1%
G 2%
L 1%
K 3%
E 4%
Fig. 2: Example of the blockchain evolution with many forks.
and so on. When the protocol terminates it outputs the block
which denotes the last block of the main branch. The chain
selection procedure relies only on the stake encoded in votes
and collected votes of virtual blocks (i.e., not included in any
actual block), and includes them in the total stake of their
chain. Ties are broken in ProPoS by simply selecting the
chain whose hash value computed over the concatenated round
beacon and whose last leader’s public key is smaller.
To illustrate the chain selection procedure we show an
example in Fig. 2 where Q/S= 10% (for a simple presentation,
in this and the following figures, the percentage within a block
denotes the supporting stake included in that block). In our
example, in round i, the leader (i.e., the creator of block E)
sees four chains, i.e., those ending with the blocks P, G, D, and
J, respectively. To determine the main chain, the leader runs
the protocol starting with the genesis block A and computes
the stake of its children’s subtrees. Block M’s subtree stake is
11% whereas B’s subtree stake is 15%. Thus, B is selected and
the leader repeats the same procedure for this block. Finally,
the leader determines A,B,C,D as the main chain, and creates
a new block E pointing to it. Moreover, the leader introduces
pointers (dashed lines) to known but yet unreported fork blocks
(P,G,J). These pointers are required to preserve the integrity of
the blockchain view. Note that the chain A,B,C,D is selected
as the main one, despite the fact that the stake that voted for
this chain is lower than the stake of the chain A,M,N,P. As
different chains within a subtree support the same chain prefix,
an advantage of combining GHOST with the most-stake rule is
that it requires an adversary to compete with the entire subtree
and not only its main chain, which makes attacks on safety
much more difficult. Repeating the procedure, round i+ 1’s
leader extends E’s chain and reports on fork blocks K and L.
E. Block Commitment
Block commitment in ProPoS is decided by every client
individually. A client specifies its risk level p∗, the block to
be committed B, and given its current view of the blockchain
calculates the probability that the target block B can be
reverted. Given our chain selection procedure, this question
can be reformulated as follows: what is the probability that
an adversary can create any stronger subtree than the corre-
sponding subtree containing B? If the probability is less than
the threshold p∗, the block is committed.
An adversarial subtree has to be rooted at a block outside
B’s supporting subtree, as otherwise, it would support B. The
stake of the supporting subtree is known to the client and
computed simply by s= TreeStake(B). An adversarial subtree
can start in any previous round, so before the block B can
be committed, we require that all its previous blocks have
also been committed. For each block, we hence consider the
potential strength of an adversarial subtree that originates in
the parent of B and which has k supporting blocks until
the current round. As such, the supporting and adversarial
branches are in competition during k rounds. The client cannot
determine how many stake units support an adversarial subtree,
but this knowledge is critical for the security of the commit
operation. Therefore, the client splits this stake into the sum
of a) missing stake which consists of those stake units that
may unknowingly contribute to the adversarial branch during
a fork, and b) adversarial stake which is the sum of the stake
that the adversary aggregated over the k rounds.
The adversarial stake units can equivocate (being already
part of the client’s blockchain view or even part of the
supporting subtree) and their size is unknown, although on
average their size will be equal to f Q. We assume the worst-
case scenario regarding the missing stake, i.e., that all missing
stake (even if it is honest) is placed in an unknown adversarial
subtree. That could happen during asynchronous periods or
network splits. The client also conservatively assumes that the
adversary would win every tie. However, we emphasize that
an adversarial subtree has to be internally correct, e.g., cannot
have equivocating votes within it, as otherwise, nodes seeing
it would not accept that view (see App. E-A for a discussion
on how ProPoS handles equivocating votes).
To commit B, the client conducts a statistical hypothesis test
to assert whether (most of) the network has the same view of
the supporting tree as the client. That is, we compute a so-
called p-value that represents the probability of achieving a
total supporting stake s over k rounds under the assumption
that fewer stake units are contributing to the supporting branch
than to the adversarial branch. We commit B if this p-value
is so low that we can safely conclude that the assumption is
invalid. The function Commit in Alg. 4 is called once every
round, and as many blocks as possible are committed during
every call. To achieve safety, we use the quorum intersection
argument present in traditional BFT systems, except in our
case it is probabilistic. Namely, an adversary in such a split
Alg. 4: The block commitment procedure.
1 function Commit(lastCommit,p∗)
2 B← GetMainChainBlockAtRound(lastCommit);
3 while B 6= nil do
4 s← TreeStake(B); k←CurrRound()− lastCommit+1;
5 if CalculateProb(k,s)≥ p∗ then // B is rejected
6 return;
7 lastCommit← lastCommit+1;
8 B← GetMainChainBlockAtRound(lastCommit);
9 function CalculateProb(k,t)
10 if Qk < MAX STAKE then
11 return HyperGeomProb(S, 12 (1+ f )S,Q,k,t);
12 return CCBound(S, 12 (1+ f )S,Q,k,t);
13 function HyperGeomProb(S,U,Q,k,t) // hypergeom. sum prob.
14 if k = 1 then
15 x← 0;
16 for i ∈ {t+1, . . . ,Q} do
17 x← x+HypergeometricPMF(S,U,Q, i);
18 return x;
19 x← 0;
20 for i ∈ {0, . . . ,Q} do
21 x← x+HypergeometricPMF(S,U,Q, i)
22 ∗ HyperGeomProb(S,U,Q,k−1,s− i);
23 return x;
24 function CCBound(S,U,Q,k,t) // the Crame´r-Chernoff bound
25 return e−k∗MaximizeRateFunc(S,U,Q,t/k);
26 function MaximizeRateFunc(S,M,Q,t)
27 λmax← RateFuncSearchRange(S,U,Q, t);
28 repeat
29 for i ∈ {1, . . . , imax} do
30 yi← RateFuncHelper(S,U,Q,λi, t);
31 ~λ ← ReduceInterval(~λ ,~y,S,U,Q, t);
32 ∆← λimax −λ0;
33 // ε is an accuracy threshold set by the user
34 until ∆< ε;
35 return (yimax − y0)/2;
36 function RateFuncHelper(S,M,Q,λ ,t)
37 return tλ −LogHyp2F1(−Q,−M,−S,1− eλ );
network could produce equivocating votes on both views at
the same time; however, the client can conclude that such a
situation is statistically unlikely if she sees that her target block
is supported by at least 23 kQ stake (see details in § IV-A).
That would imply that most of the honest nodes see the
target block on the main chain as any alternative adversarial
view can obtain only less than 23 kQ over time (since f <
1
3 ).
The process is described by the pseudocode of Alg. 4. At
the core of the procedure, the client keeps committing the
main chain’s subsequent blocks computing the probability that
their corresponding supporting trees are on the “safe” side
of the hypothetical fork. Depending on the parameters, the
probability is computed using one of two functions, namely
HyperGeomProb or CramerBound (see Alg. 4). In § IV-A,
we discuss these algorithms in more detail and show that
they indeed give an upper bound on the error probability. To
illustrate this process we present an example in App. E-C.
To keep our presentation simple, we do not parametrize
the commit procedure by the f parameter. However, it would
not change our methodology, and in practice, it may be an
interesting feature as clients could then base commitment
decisions on their own adversarial assumptions in addition to
their security level p∗.
Alg. 5: The reward procedure.
1 function RoundReward(B)
2 pay(B.pk,Rl); // leader’s block reward (+ opt. tx fees)
3 for v ∈ B.V do
4 pay(v.pk,v.s∗Rv); // voter’s reward
5 pay(B.pk,v.s∗Ri); // leader’s inclusion reward
F. Random Beacon
ProPoS relies on random beacons to elect round leaders
and voters. It is important for security that these beacons are
(pseudo)random and difficult to be biased by adversaries. In
this paper we do not propose a random beacon construction
and for a concrete instantiation we rely on previously proposed
concepts. For the current implementation, we have followed
the approach by Daian et al. [18], where beacons are generated
purely from the random values aggregated over “stable” blocks
of the main chain. More precisely, as presented in § III-B, an
i-th round leader inserts a random value ri into its block. For
the security parameter κ (the number of main chain’s blocks
after which the probability of a roll back is negligible), the
random beacon r in the current round j is extracted in a two-
step process, using a random oracle, from the previous random
values r j−2κ ,r j−2κ+1,r j−2κ+2, ...,r j−κ . An adversary can bias
the outcome beacon r; however, it has been proven in [18] that
short-time adversarial biases in the randomness are insufficient
to get a long-term significant advantage.
We emphasize that the use of a random beacon for
leader/committee selection is not specific to ProPoS and other
random beacon constructions can also be used to implement
ProPoS. Some recent approaches, e.g., DFINITY [28] and
RandHound [41], promise scalable randomness and are po-
tentially more bias-resistant than the presented mechanism.
We leave the investigation of these schemes combined with
ProPoS as future work.
G. Rewards
ProPoS introduces the rewarding scheme presented in
Alg. 5. Each voter supporting the previous block of the main
chain receives a voter reward Rv multiplied by the number
of stake units that the voter was sampled with. The votes of
virtual blocks (i.e., when votes commit a chain whose the last
leader did not publish its block) also receive rewards as soon
as a block containing them is published. Every leader who
publishes a block on the main chain receives a leader reward
Rl and an inclusion reward Ri for every stake unit included in
the block. Leaders may also receive transaction fees paid by
clients but we omit them as they are application-specific.
The rewarding scheme in ProPoS has several goals. First, it
aims to incentivize voters to publish votes supporting their
strongest views immediately. Forked or “late” votes (and
blocks) are marked in main chain blocks, but they are not
rewarded (leaders still have an incentive to include forked
and late votes and blocks as they strengthen the main chain).
Therefore, voters trying to wait for a few blocks to vote for
“past best blocks” would always lose their rewards. Second,
it incentivizes leaders to publish their blocks on time, as a
block received after the end of the round would not be part
of the main chain (i.e., voters of the next round would follow
their strongest view instead), thus the leader would miss out
on her rewards. Lastly, the scheme incentivizes block leaders
to include all received votes. A leader censoring votes loses an
inclusion reward proportional to the stake that was censored.
Moreover, the censoring leader weakens her own blocks.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Probabilistic Safety
In this section we show that a block B is committed only if
the probability that a conflicting block is committed is indeed
below p∗. To do this, we use a novel proof technique based on
statistical hypothesis testing. A block is committed by a user
when she sees enough supporting stake to conclude that it is
unlikely that she is on a branch that includes only a minority of
honest users. We consider an adversary who wants to cause
a safety fault, which means that two conflicting blocks are
committed by different users. For this to occur, two users who
have different views of the blockchain must both see enough
evidence for their blocks to commit. our worst-case scenario –
i.e., scenario in which this is most likely to occur – is when the
honest users are split during a fork. The adversary tries to make
a safety fault more likely by voting on both branches of the
fork simultaneously. Although equivocations can be punished
in retrospect, this cannot be detected while the fork is ongoing
and therefore cannot be ruled out for our safety analysis. We
assume that a fraction f ∈ [0, 13 ) of the stake is controlled by
the adversary. We furthermore assume that the fork consists of
two branches, and that the honest stake is split evenly among
them. The reason is that if one branch is stronger than the
other, then it is less likely that a block will ever be committed
on the weaker branch. Similarly, there is no need to consider
forks with three or more branches, because the probability of
conflicting blocks being committed would be higher if two of
the branches were combined. Finally, we do not consider users
going offline or votes being withheld by the adversary, as this
would only make one branch weaker and a safety fault less
likely, and therefore represents a weaker adversarial scenario
than the one under consideration. The user cannot directly
observe how many users are on the two branches – however,
she can observe how many stake units support the block on
her branch. The expected stake fraction on her branch is f +
1
2 (1− f ) = 12 (1+ f ), so 23 if f = 13 (this is the same for users
on the other branch). If she observes that the amount of stake
on her branch is considerably higher than this fraction, then
she has evidence to conclude that her branch is stronger. In
the following, we will formulate the question of whether there
is sufficient evidence to commit B as a hypothesis test. Before
we proceed, we note that for B to be committed, we require
that all preceding blocks have also been committed. Hence,
we only focus on B and its supporting subtree, and do not
consider any of B’s ancestors (see also the example in Fig. 3).
Recall that there are S ∈ N stake units of equal weight,
where a single node may control many stake units. We draw a
committee of size Q stake units in every round (e.g., in Fig. 3 it
holds that Q= 110 S). We assume that S and Q remain constant
H I J
E 2.0%
G
A 2.0% B 8.5% C 8.5% D 6.5% F 8.5%
Fig. 3: If the user tries to commit B, we only evaluate the strength of
B and its supporting subtree, and implicitly compare it to the branch
(G,H, I,J). Even though A is weak, and B might be overturned due to
a branch starting from A’s predecessor, we require that A has already
been committed before committing B, so it need not be considered.
throughout the duration of the fork. We denote the number of
expected supporting stake units per round on the user’s branch
by U . We also assume that U does not change during the fork –
i.e., that users do not move between branches while the fork is
ongoing. We can make this assumption because the adversary
is equivocating – the adversary is voting on both branches
already, and if any of the honest users would move from one
branch to the other then they would detect the equivocation.
We assume that in a given round l, the user is interested in
testing whether the amount of stake that supports a block B
that appeared in round j is enough to commit it. The null
hypothesis H0 asserts that the supporting stake is at most equal
to the expected worst-case support, i.e.,
H0 : U ≤ 12 (1+ f )S. (3)
In the following, we compute the probability p of observing
a given amount of supporting stake in B’s subtree given that
H0 is true. This probability is commonly called a p-value.
If the p-value is below p∗, then we accept the alternative
hypothesis H1 : M > 12 (1+ f )S and commit the block. Of
course, this experiment may be repeated over the course of
several slots until B is finally committed (or if B is dropped
after the resolution of the fork). Hence, we use a sequential
hypothesis test. In the following, we first focus on calculating
the probability of observing the data (i.e., the supporting stake
for the block B) given the null hypothesis for given rounds l
and j, and then extend this to the sequential setting.
Let Xi be the number of stake units held by supporting
users sampled in round i. Since the cryptographic sampling
algorithm draws without replacement, we know that Xi has a
hypergeometric distribution [30], whose probability mass func-
tion is given by P(Xi = x) =
(
U
x
)(
S−U
Q− x
)
/
(
S
Q
)
. The total
number of supporting units (where a single unit may feature
in more than one different rounds) that is drawn in rounds
j+1, . . . , l is then given by T =∑li=n+1 Xi. Since X1,X2, . . . are
all identically distributed, this means that T has the distribution
of k = l − j independent hypergeometric random variables.
Hence, to calculate the probability of observing a total amount
of supporting stake t given the null hypothesis, we can
compute the tail probability P(T > t) =∑kQi=t+1P(T = i) under
the assumption that U = 12 (1+ f )S (of all possible values for
U included under H0, this would give the highest probability.)
Unfortunately, a sum/convolution of hypergeometric random
variables does not have a probability mass function that is
easy to compute. It can be expressed as
P(T = t) =
Q
∑
x2=0
Q
∑
x3=0
. . .
Q
∑
xk=0
k
∏
i=2
P(Xi = xi)P
(
X1 = t−
k
∑
i=2
xi
)
.
This expression is derived in Lemma C.1 in the appendix. The
intuition behind it is as follows: for all possible sequences
(x2,x3, . . . ,xm), we calculate the probability of observing it,
and then multiply this by the probability that X1 is exactly
t minus the sum of the sequence. This is what is imple-
mented in Alg. 4: the recursion encapsulates the repeated
sum, while the final computation of P(X1 = t −∑ki=2 xi) is
done in lines 14 through 18. Numerically, it can be simplified
somewhat (i.e., it is not necessary to consider sequences whose
sum already exceeds t). However, to compute this probability
it is inescapable that the number of operations is roughly
proportional to Qk, which is very large even for moderate
values of k. This is the intuition behind the if-statement in
line 10 of Alg. 4: the exact computation is only performed
if Ql− j = Qk is small enough, i.e., below some threshold that
depends on the client’s processing power.
One less computationally expensive approach would to find
an approximation for the distribution of T . Good candidates
include a single hypergeometric (with parameters kS, kM,
and kQ instead of S, M, and Q), a binomial (for which
we draw with instead of without replacement), a Poisson
(which approximates the binomial distribution), or a normally
distributed (by the Central Limit Theorem) random variable.
However, in the following we instead focus on establishing
bounds using the Crame´r-Chernoff method [10]. The reasons
for this are twofold. First, it gives us a strict upper bound on
the probability of interest regardless of the parameter choice,
which is safer than an asymptotically valid approximation.
Second, it can be more easily generalized to settings where
the distribution of the random variables is slightly different.
We have also investigated other methods for bounding the
tail probabilities of T , e.g., the Chernoff-Hoeffding bound,
and the approaches of [33] and [43]. However, the Crame´r-
Chernoff bounds were found to be the sharpest while still
being computationally feasible.
The Crame´r-Chernoff method can be used to find an upper
bound on the probability P(X > t) for any random variable X .
Its basis is Markov’s inequality,3 which states that for any non-
negative random variable X and a > 0, P(X ≥ a)≤ E(x)/a.
It can then be shown [10] that for any λ > 0, P(X ≥ t) =
P(eλX ≥ eλ t) ≤ E(e−λX )e−λ t = e−(λ t−cX (λ )), where cX (λ ) =
log(E(e−λX )). Since this holds for all λ > 0, we can
choose λ such that the bound is sharpest. Let rX (t) =
supλ>0(λ t− cX (λ )), then P(X > t)≤ e−rX (t). In particular, if
T = X1+ . . .+Xn, such that all Xi, i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} are mutually
independent and have the same probability distribution as X ,
then cT (λ ) = log(E(e−λT )) = log
(
∏ni=1E(e−λXi)
)
= ncX (λ )
and hence rT (nt)= supλ>0(nλ t−ncX (λ ))= nrX (t), and there-
fore P(T > t/n) ≤ e−nrX (t). Common names for rX include
3https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Markov’s inequality
the Legendre-Fenchel transform4 or the large-deviations rate
function of X after its use in Crame´r’s theorem for large
deviations.5 In our context, t/k is the average supporting
stake accumulated per round. As shown in Lemma C.3 in
the appendix, if t/k is higher than the expected worst-case
supporting stake (which equals QU/S), then the probability
that the adversary wins decreases exponentially in k. In fact,
the function rX represents the exponential rate at which this
probability decreases (hence the name “rate function”).
As an example, let S = 1500, U = 1000, and Q = 150.
We find that rX (b 34 Qc) = rX (112) ≈ 2.50. This means that
the probability under the null hypothesis that we observe an
average support of 75% of the committee for k rounds in a row
decreases at least exponentially with a factor of e−2.50 ≈ 0.082
per round. This is displayed in Fig. 4, for s¯ = 7.5%. After 15
rounds, the probability of observing support from, on average,
75% of the committee is less than 10−16 under H0.
The function cX (λ ) does not have a convenient closed-form
expression: it is equal to 2F1(−Q,−M,−S,1−eλ ) [45], where
2F1 is the Gaussian or ordinary hypergeometric function.6
Hence, the rate function has to be evaluated numerically.
Since cX (λ ) is convex on λ > 0 (see also Lemma C.2 in
the appendix), there is only one local optimum and we can
therefore use some variation of golden-section search7 to find
it. The procedure in Alg. 4 is as follows: we first determine
a search range for λ by widening a base interval until we
observe that the function decreases at some point in the
interval. We then iteratively narrow the interval until its width
is below some accuracy threshold. A baseline implementation
is given in Alg. 6 in the appendix. Computation of the rate
function is still not trivial, although it depends on the size
of Q: for Q = 150, roughly 15 instances can be computed
per second on a MacBook Pro with a 2.5 GHz Intel Core
i7 processor, compared to 280/s for Q = 30 and 0.6/s for
Q = 750. Still, although there is no theoretical limit on the
number of blocks that can be committed in a single round via
the Commit function in Alg. 4, in practice it is unlikely that
more than several blocks are committed in a single round, as
the evidence for committing is accumulated slowly.
Fig. 4 depicts the evolution of the bounds if the same aver-
age supporting stake s¯ is observed over k rounds consecutively.
It is clear that, as expected, larger committee sizes mean that
large deviations are less likely, and therefore that the user is
able to commit sooner. Hence, there is a trade-off between
security and efficiency. Even if Q = 30 and on average 24
stake units vote to support a block, then the p-value decreases
by almost 75% per round (i.e., e−rX (24) ≈ 0.263).
Although we have so far focused on a single test conducted
in round l about a block B in slot j, in practice the test for
B will be performed multiple times if there is not enough
evidence to commit immediately. Every time the test is per-
formed, there is some probability of error, so we need to
4Strictly speaking, only after broadening the range of the supremum.
5https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Crame´r’s theorem (large deviations)
6https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Hypergeometric function
7https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Golden-section search
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Fig. 4: The Crame´r-Chernoff bound pˆ for the probability that a block
B is overturned, assuming that B, and its supporting subtree in each
of the k−1 subsequent rounds, contain s¯ stake units. In these figures,
S = 1500, U = 1000, and Q varies. Clearly, when the committee size
grows larger, the probability that the supporting stake is substantially
larger than the expected value under the null hypothesis vanishes.
account for this accumulation. The most straightforward way
to achieve this is as follows: if we conduct the test for the ith
time, we use p∗ ·β i for some β ∈ (0,1) as our threshold. The
total probability of error after a potentially infinite number of
trials is then ∑∞i=1 p∗β i =
β
1−β p
∗. For example, if β = 910 , then
we need to multiply our probability threshold by 1−ββ =
1
9
(e.g., if we originally had set a threshold of 10−16 then we
would now use ≈1.11 · 10−17), and the threshold for the p-
value would become lower (so harder to meet) by 10% each
round. This is not a major obstacle: as mentioned before, even
for a committee size of 30 and an average supporting stake of
80%, the p-value decreases considerably faster than by 10%
per round, and the multiplicative factor of 1/9 is met after
only 2 additional rounds.
The conclusions that we can draw from our analysis are
as follows. If two honest users on separate branches are
performing the same experiment, and the honest stake is split
evenly between the two branches, then the probability that
both users commit is (p∗)2 (or even lower if there is negative
correlation between the stake on the two branches, which is
the case if the implementation of the random beacon is such
that the same committee is chosen for different blocks in the
same round), so this is much lower than p∗. In the case where
the stake is not evenly split among the two branches, then if
the user is on the weaker branch, the probability that she ever
commits B is below p∗. If the user is instead on the stronger
branch, then the probability that the honest users on the weaker
branch ever commit is below p∗. Hence, the probability of both
B and a conflicting block being committed is below p∗ in all
settings. Our safety property is therefore satisfied.
Long-range Attacks. Our safety analysis also naturally ex-
tends to non-trusted checkpointing as an additional defense.
Namely, if a block has so many confirmations that the proba-
bility of overturning it is lower than some pre-defined negligi-
ble threshold (e.g., 2−256 ≈ 10−77.06), then it is reasonable for
a client to consider this block as a checkpoint. Hence, the client
would never revert this block except in the case of a manual
reset, mitigating long-range attacks. (In App. E-A we also
discuss other measures deployed by ProPoS to disincentivize
adversaries from equivocating on the blockchain.)
B. Liveness
In our analysis we assume the partially synchronous net-
work model, where after the GST the network is synchronous
for t rounds. We follow the same setup in § IV-C and § IV-D.
To prove liveness we use two lemmas (see App. D). In short,
they state that with increasing t, after t rounds, a) the main
chain includes at least t(1− f )Q stake units (Lemma D.1), and
b) the main chain includes n blocks that the honest participants
voted for, where t ≥ n≥ dt(1−2 f )e (Lemma D.2).
Theorem IV.1. ProPoS achieves liveness.
Proof. We show that the probability that within t = 2t ′ rounds
an honest node appends a block to the main chain and the
block is committed by every honest node is overwhelming,
with t increasing.
By using Lemma D.2, we obtain that the n′ (increasing
proportionally with t ′) blocks of the main chain were supported
(thus visible) by honest majority. Now, to violate liveness,
the adversary has to be elected as a leader for all of those
contributed n′ rounds.8 The adversary is elected as a round
leader with the probability proportional to her stake possession
f < 13 . Therefore, the probability that at least one honest node
adds a block in those n′ visible rounds is 1− f n′ , which with
increasing t ′ goes to 1.
Now, after the first t ′ rounds, the block will be on the
main chain, thus honest nodes over the next t ′ rounds will
be supporting the block by their stake of the total amount
at least t ′(1− f )Q units (see Lemma D.1) with t ′ increasing.
We assume that f < 13 , which means that there exists some
ε > 0 such that f = 13 − ε . This means that the expected
amount of supporting stake per round will be ( 23 + ε)Q, even
if the adversarial nodes never vote. By the weak law of large
numbers, the probability that the average supporting stake after
t ′ rounds is not above 23 Q goes to zero as t
′ goes to infinity. We
know by Lemma C.3 that if the observed average supporting
stake is greater than the mean, the rate function evaluated at
this average is greater than 0. By substituting the threshold
f = 13 into (3), we learn that U ≤ 23 S, and that the expected per-
round supporting stake under the null hypothesis QU/S equals
at most 23 Q. Since we therefore observe more than the mean
under the null hypothesis on average, the per-round decay rate
will be greater than 1, and the upper bound on the test p-value
goes to 0 as t ′ goes to infinity. As such, there will be some
t ′ at which the p-value goes below p∗, which means that the
user can commit. This completes the proof for liveness.
8In such a case the adversary could append blocks with no transactions,
append them to a different (weaker) fork, or not publish them at all.
In practice, the required length of t depends on the values
of S, Q, f , and p∗, and can be directly derived from the bound
given in § IV-A.
C. Fairness
Let us define R(t) as the total expected reward of an honest
node with α stake fraction during t synchronous rounds after
GST. Next we show that ProPoS is a fair protocol.
Theorem IV.2. R(t) =Θ(t)
Proof. Every round (see Alg. 5), a node has the expected
voter’s reward ev = αQRv, and the expected leader’s reward
of el = α(Rl +QRi) (contributions of inclusion rewards Ri
may vary and in the worst case el can be αRl). As shown
in Lemma D.2, honest nodes participate in n blocks of the
main chain during t rounds, with n growing proportional to
t. We assume that an adversary can censor the node’s votes
(removing her voter rewards) but that will not happen in
n(1− f ) rounds on average (i.e., when an honest leader is
elected). Thus n(el +ev)≥ R(t)≥ n(el +ev(1− f )), and given
the bounds for n (Lemma D.2), the following holds
t(el + ev)≥ R(t)≥ dt(1−2 f )e(el + ev(1− f )).
Another advantage of our reward scheme is that it rewards
active nodes frequently. In every round, Q stake units are
awarded as voter rewards and one leader obtains leader
rewards. The rewards are given uniformly at random and
proportional to stake possession. In an example setting where
S = 104, Q = 200, L = 1, even a node with a small stake
possession α = 1/S would receive a voter reward every 50
rounds and a leader reward every 104 rounds, on average.
With a realistic round time 2∆= 5s, this would be 250 seconds
and 13.9 hours, respectively. By contrast, systems that award
only leaders would not give these frequent voter rewards. For
instance, in Bitcoin (where only leader awards exist and rounds
last 10 minutes on average) the node would receive a reward
every 70 days on average. By combining frequent rewards
with fairness (Theorem IV.2), ProPoS minimizes the reward
variance which is seen as the root cause of creating large
mining pools which introduce centralization into the system.
D. Rewards and Incentives
To reason about rewards in ProPoS, we use a definition
similar to the one by Pass and Shi in [38]. We call a proto-
col’s reward scheme α-coalition-safe if, with overwhelming
probability, no α ′ < α fraction coalition can gain more than
a multiplicative factor (1 + ε) of the total system rewards.
Intuitively, it means that with overwhelming probability, for
any coalition of nodes, the fraction of their rewards (within
a time period) is upper-bounded by (1+ρ)R(t), while a solo
node is guaranteed to receive at least (1−ρ)R(t). Thus, the
multiplicative increase in the reward is 1+ρ1−ρ ≤ 1+ ε .
Using this definition, we show how relationships between
rewards in ProPoS influence its coalition-safety. As shown in
Theorem IV.2, the total reward of a node with α stake fraction
during t synchronous rounds is between n(el +ev) and n(el +
ev(1− f )). Thus 1+ρ1−ρ = n(el+ev)n(el+ev(1− f )) and the following holds:
ρ = f ev2el+ev(2− f ) . We also have
n(el+ev)
n(el+ev(1− f )) ≤ (1+ε) owing to
1+ρ
1−ρ ≤ (1+ ε), resulting in ε ≤ f evel+ev(1− f ) .
As we want to minimize ρ and ε , owing to ev = αQRv, and
el = α(Rl +QRi), we wish to minimize f QRv2(Rl+QRi)+QRvev(2− f )
and f QRvRl+QRi+QRvev(1− f ) , thus, Rl should be large enough to
make ρ and ε smaller, i.e., Rl  Rv and Rl  Ri.
We suggest that Rv is higher than Ri. The intuition behind
this choice is that as voter rewards Rv are received frequently
when compared with inclusion rewards Ri received only by
a leader. A too high Ri would contribute to a high reward
variance and could incentivize nodes to join their stake into
pools (as in PoW systems), introducing centralization risks.
Therefore, with Rv > Ri, we propose the following relation-
ships between rewards in ProPoS: Rl  Rv > Ri.
Our rewarding scheme (§ III-G), aims to incentivize a) vot-
ers to broadcast their votes immediately, b) leaders to broad-
cast their blocks immediately, and c) leaders to include all
received votes in their blocks. We informally reason about its
incentive-compatibility in a setting with synchrony, a single
leader elected per round, and rational nodes (optimizing only
for their rewards). If a voter does not publish its vote on
time, it will not reach the round’s leader, who subsequently
cannot include this vote in her block, thus the voter loses her
reward Rv. Similarly, if the leader does not publish her block
immediately, it is not received by other nodes, who in the next
round will vote for a virtual block, ignoring the late block and
hence not awarding the rewards Rv and Ri to the leader. If the
leader publishes blocks but without some of the received votes,
then the leader is losing the inclusion reward Ri proportional
to the stake of the ignored votes.
E. Scalability and Parametrization
In order to evaluate how different configurations influence
ProPoS’s performance and security, we have built a ProPoS
simulator and conducted a series of experiments. For our
simulations, we introduced 5000 active nodes with one stake
unit each (thus S = 5000) and a single leader per round
(L = 1). (The number of nodes is comparable with the es-
timated number of all active Ethereum nodes [1].) To model
the network latencies while propagating messages we used
the data from https://ethstats.net/, which in real-time collects
various information (like the block propagation time) from
volunteer Ethereum nodes. In this setting, we ran simulations
for different values of Q and ∆, where each simulation run was
for 10000 blocks. We measured the block and vote stale rates
ψb and ψv, which respectively describe how many blocks and
votes do not make it onto the main chain.
The obtained results are presented in Fig. 5. We see that if
∆ is too short, then protocol performance decreases as stale
rates for both blocks and votes are high. Besides influencing
performance (fewer blocks denote lower throughput), high
stale rates degrade security as it takes longer to commit a
block (see § IV-A). However, when ∆ is slightly increased,
the stale rates improve significantly. We found that choosing ∆
between 3-4 seconds may be good for the considered network
0 1 2 3 4 50
10
20
30
40
50
∆ (sec)
st
al
e 
ra
te
 (%
)
Q = 50
 
 
ψb: block stale rate
ψ
v
: vote stale rate
0 1 2 3 4 50
10
20
30
40
50
∆ (sec)
st
al
e 
ra
te
 (%
) Q = 100
0 1 2 3 4 50
10
20
30
40
50
∆ (sec)
st
al
e 
ra
te
 (%
) Q = 150
0 1 2 3 4 50
10
20
30
40
50
∆ (sec)
st
al
e 
ra
te
 (%
) Q = 200
Fig. 5: Simulated stale rates.
conditions. We confirm our results in § V. Moreover, with
increasing Q, we see only a mild increase in the stale rates.
V. IMPLEMENTATION AND EVALUATION
Implementation. To test and evaluate ProPoS we fully imple-
mented it. Our implementation is based mainly on Python. For
implementing the p2p networking stack, we use the Twisted
framework while we deployed Ed25519 signatures [7]. The
advantage of this scheme is that is produces short public
keys and signatures (32 and 64 bytes, respectively). In our
implementation, we have encoded a vote in 80 bytes, and
votes are included within their respective blocks. Although
the number of votes is linear, even for large values of Q
the introduced bandwidth overhead should be acceptable.
For instance, 1000 support votes with our encoding would
consume 80kB, which constitutes only 4% of a 2MB block.
Furthermore, in future ProPoS implementations, votes can be
realized by threshold signatures giving a short constant-size
group signature; however, these schemes would currently be
a bottleneck in our scheme.
Evaluation. Equipped with our implementation we conducted
a series of experiments in a real-world setting. We set up a
testbed consisting of physical machines geographically dis-
tributed among 15 different locations from five continents.
We used these machines to run 100 ProPoS nodes in total.
We used a simple p2p flooding where every node peered with
up to five peers. We first investigated the throughput of the
network and we obtained an average end-to-end throughput of
around 10 Mbps. To introduce a conservative setting and better
express real-world heterogeneous network conditions we did
not optimize our network by techniques like efficient message
dissemination or geographical peer selection.
We decided to deploy 2MB blocks on our network. In our
setting, all our 100 nodes are elected as voters (i.e., Q = 100)
while only one node per round is elected as leader. From
the performance point of view, such a setting would be for
instance equivalent to the setting when there are 2000 nodes
in the system and Q/S = 5%. During the execution of our
experiments, we noticed an imbalance between the durations
of the protocol steps. Namely, votes constitute only a small
part of the blocks that actually carry transactions, so if the
Tab. I: The performance results obtained.
∆1 ∆2 ψb(%) ψv(%) tps
1.0 4.0 14.3 33.5 2286
3.0 3.0 2.5 22.3 2167
2.0 3.0 0 23.0 2667
2.5 3.0 0 20.6 2058
2.0 4.0 0 5.4 2222
1.5 4.0 0 5.3 2424
nodes spend too much time waiting for votes (the same ∆ is
specified as the waiting time for both votes and blocks), then
this would not allow us to saturate the network. To maximize
the throughput we introduced separate waiting times for votes
and blocks (i.e., ∆1 and ∆2 respectively, where ∆1 < ∆2).
We have run a series of experiments with different ∆1 and
∆2 parameters and our results are presented in Tab. I. Namely,
we measure the following three performance indicators: the
block and vote stale rates (ψb and ψv as defined in § IV-E) and
the number of transactions per second (tps) that our protocol
achieves in a given setting.9 We found ∆1 = 1.5s and ∆2 =
4.0s as a promising configuration for our setting. With these
parameters, all blocks were part of the main chain and their
propagation time (i.e., ∆2) allowed voters to produce only 5%
of stale or missing votes. Moreover, even in this conservative
setting ProPoS yielded throughput of almost 2.5k tps.
VI. COMPARISON TO ALGORAND
In this section we compare ProPoS to Algorand [27],
which is a closely-related PoS protocol. Algorand is similar
to ProPoS in the sense that 1) the protocol operates as a
sequence of rounds, 2) leaders and committee members are
selected in each round based on a random beacon that changes
between rounds, 3) the likelihood that a node is selected as a
leader or committee member is proportional to its number of
stake units, 4) committee members vote on blocks proposed
by the leaders, and 5) blocks are committed if they receive
a sufficient number of votes. However, there are also two
crucial differences. The first is that instead of the cryptographic
sampling procedure of Alg. 2, Algorand elects leaders and
committee members in every round by running a VRF [35]
over the round’s random beacon. As a result, the number
of leaders and committee members in each round is random
instead of fixed, and as we show the added variance makes
block commitment less secure. Second, instead of the voting
and sequential hypothesis testing procedures of Alg. 1 and 4,
Algorand uses a bespoke Byzantine agreement protocol (BA?)
to commit blocks. However, BA? includes many steps during
which no transactions are added to the blockchain, and the
security analysis for BA? is more restricted than for ProPoS.
There are other differences (e.g., rewards and fairness are
not discussed in [27]), but due to space restrictions we only
elaborate on the two main differences. We first discuss some of
Algorand’s technical details that we need for our comparison.
9We assumed 150B-long transactions, that, using the Ed25519 signature
scheme, allows us to encode sender and receiver public keys (32B each), a
signature (64B), and some transaction metadata (22B).
A. Technical Discussion of Algorand
In each round of Algorand, each node uses a VRF with the
user’s private key to calculate a hash of the random beacon
concatenated with a “role” index. Each round in Algorand con-
sists of two phases, and there are three roles: block proposer,
initial (“step”) committee member, and final committee mem-
ber. The value of the calculated hash determines how many of
the node’s stake units qualify for each role. For any node, let N
be the number of stake units that it controls, and NROLE be the
number of stake units that are assigned to a given role. Alg. 1
of [27] then ensures that NROLE is binomially distributed with
P(NROLE = n) =
(
N
n
)
pROLEn(1− pROLE)N−n, where pROLE is
the probability for each single stake unit that it is assigned
to ROLE. The probabilities are chosen such that the expected
total numbers of block proposers, initial committee members,
and final committee members per round equal τPROPOSER, τSTEP,
and τFINAL, respectively. Each leader proposes a block such
that there is a priority relation between the proposed blocks
that is obvious to all nodes. The committee members wait a
fixed amount of time per round (λPRIORITY) to receive blocks.
Next, they initiate Phase 1 in which they vote for the highest-
priority block that they are aware of (Alg. 7 of [27]). If a
block receives more than TSTEP ·τSTEP votes across two rounds
of voting (“steps”), it advances to Phase 2. Phase 2 (Alg. 8
of [27]) consists of a sequence of steps in which the initial
committee members either vote for the block from Phase 1 or
an empty block. If either option receives more than TSTEP ·τSTEP
votes during a step, it is subjected to a final vote among the
final committee members. If the block receives more than
TFINAL · τFINAL votes in the final vote, then it is committed
by the nodes. Each step in either phase of BA? takes λSTEP
time units. The Algorand white paper provides a set of of
benchmark parameters for BA? (see Fig. 4 of [27]) to ensure
that the probability of a safety fault is sufficiently small (less
than 10−7 over 1000 rounds) if the adversary controls at most
20% of the stake: λPRIORITY = 5 seconds, λSTEP = 20 seconds,
τPROPOSER = 26, τSTEP = 2000, τFINAL = 10000, TSTEP = 0.685,
and TFINAL = 0.74.
B. Random vs. Fixed Committee Sizes
We first investigate what the impact would be if Alg. 2
of ProPoS were replaced by Algorand’s committee selection
procedure, so that L and Q are no longer fixed. The main con-
sequence is that the additional variance due to the committee
sizes makes it harder to make block commitment decisions
using hypothesis testing. This difference in terms of variance is
made explicit in Tab. II of App. E-E. In particular, the quantity
of supporting stake per round X was previously hypergeomet-
ric (drawing Q samples without replacement from a population
of size S of which U support the user’s branch), whereas in
the setting with VRFs it is binomial with a considerably larger
population size (drawing S samples such that each is in the
committee with probability Q/S and supportive of the user’s
branch with probability U/S). The variance is typically around
3-4 times higher in the new setting if the adversary controls
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Fig. 6: Number of rounds needed before a block can be committed
given an average supporting stake fraction per round s¯ for fixed
committee sizes (ProPoS) and VRFs. It takes around 3-4 times longer
to commit using VRFs.
one third of the stake (i.e., U/S = 23 ). As we can see from
Fig. 6, this translates into block commitment times that are also
roughly 3-4 times higher. For this experiment, we calculated
numerically for different values of the average supporting stake
per round s¯ how many rounds it would take to commit in
a setting where p∗ = 10−64, S = 1500, U = 1000, Q = 150,
and β = 0.99 (as discussed in § IV-A). If X is binomially
distributed, then T = ∑li=n+1 Xi is also binomially distributed,
so we do not need to use the Crame´r-Chernoff method to
bound the probability P(T > t) for the VRF setting because
we can calculate it directly. However, the looseness of the
Crame´r-Chernoff bound is clearly offset by the VRF method’s
higher variance. It can also be seen that if s¯ is high enough,
then ProPoS can commit the blocks very quickly. For example,
if s¯ is at least equal to 98%, then the protocol can commit
within 3 rounds despite the very high security requirement
(i.e., a safety error probability per round of 10−64). As long
as s¯ is above 86%, ProPoS can commit within 10 rounds –
with 5.5 seconds per round (see Tab. I), this is still only 55
seconds and therefore much less than the (on average) hour
for 6 confirmations in Bitcoin.
C. Hypothesis Testing vs. Byzantine Agreement
Although the use of VRFs increases the number of rounds
needed to commit a block using hypothesis testing, the value
proposition of Algorand’s BA? algorithm is that it can commit
blocks within a single round. However, there are several
important caveats. The first is that even in the best-case
scenario, the two phases of BA? take 2 steps each, so a
round in Algorand takes at least λPRIORITY + 4 · λSTEP = 85
seconds, which is the same as 15 rounds of ProPoS. No
transactions are added during the BA? steps, whereas in
ProPoS transaction-containing blocks are confirmed by other
transaction-containing blocks. The second is that the security
analysis relies on larger committee sizes (10,000 stake units
in the final round) and a weaker adversary (who only controls
20% of the stake) than ProPoS. Finally, each user in ProPoS
is able to set her security threshold p∗ individually depending
on her risk tolerance, whereas Algorand has a fixed set of
security parameters that determine block commitment.
VII. OTHER RELATED WORK
Because of space limits, we discuss only the most related
systems and we refer readers to recent surveys [15], [4], [37]
for a more complete picture. Initial PoS protocols tried to
extend or modify Nakamoto’s consensus by taking stake into
consideration, resulting in hybrid PoS-PoW systems [32], [6],
later improved by pure PoS systems. Bentov et al. propose a
protocol [5] where nodes who commit to the chain generate
randomness for a given round. While the randomness is gen-
erated it is used to coordinate the extension of the blockchain
in the next several rounds. Other PoS protocols [22], [44]
try to emulate the mining process of Nakamoto Consensus
by using unique digital signatures. All these systems aim
to remove the energy waste of Bitcoin; however, they share
multiple other drawbacks of Nakamoto consensus, like slow
(probabilistic) finalization, a tendency to centralization via
high reward variance, or high stale block rates (due to a
probabilistic leader election).
Another class of PoS systems is protocols where a com-
mittee is elected and involved in the process of blockchain
extension. In Ouroboros [31], a committee is formed in every
round from the stakeholders. The committee members run
a three-phase leader election protocol that requires strong
synchronization. Ouroboros is presented using a synchronous
network model and this assumption is relaxed by Ouroboros
Praos [19], which is presented using a partially synchronous
network model. It also extends its predecessor by mitigating
adaptive corruptions via a VRF-based election and by employ-
ing key-evolving signatures to achieve forward security (i.e.,
an adversary compromising a node cannot use its private key
for signing older messages). Further, this protocol is improved
by Ouroboros Genesis [3], the current version of the protocol,
which proposes a chain selection rule that allows newcomers
or offline parties to securely join the protocol. Ouroboros
shares the limitations of longest-chain PoS protocols as re-
ported by Brown-Cohen et al. [12] (we discuss this result
later in this section). Moreover, the protocol leaves rewards
and incentives as future work. In particular, we believe that
Ouroboros, by using a block structure similar to Bitcoin (i.e.,
a single voting entity per block), would introduce high reward
variance. Up to our best knowledge, in all widely deployed
blockchain systems with similar design, this was one of the
reasons that have inevitably led to centralization of voting
power around mining/stake pools [25]. In fact, Cardano, a
cryptocurrency built upon Ouroboros, encourages users to
either join or create stake pools [2].
Snow White [18] is another longest-chain PoS protocol in
which in every round a block proposer is elected (pseudo-
randomly) from a reconfigurable committee. An important
advantage of Snow White, in contrast to other committee-
based protocols, is that it is designed for network conditions
including temporal asynchronicity and network partitions, or
the “sleepy” model of node participation [39]. Moreover, Snow
White proposes a chain-based beacon generation (we use this
method as the default random beacon in ProPoS), and secure
committee reconfiguration and leader election procedures that
mitigate some adaptive adversaries.
Tendermint [34] is a PoS protocol inspired by traditional
BFT protocols. Tendermint elects leaders using round-robin
and a committee in a (pseudo)random way, proportional to
nodes’ stake possession. The committee members run a BFT-
like protocol to agree on the proposed block. To avoid attacks
on leaders (round leaders are known in advance) it pro-
poses a lightweight network-level anonymity solution. Casper
FFG [13] is a PoS system designed to provide finality for
underlying PoW or PoS blockchains. Casper is also inspired by
traditional BFT protocols; however, its main observation is that
BFT-like logics can be encoded as a sequence of messages of
the same type. Casper is designed for an open setting, enabling
a dynamic set of nodes and incentive-based protection against
equivocation (misbehaving nodes risk losing their deposits),
but it shares the scalability limitations of traditional BFT
protocols. Under the Ethereum 2.0 roadmap, Casper FFG is
planned to provide finality first to the legacy PoW and later
a novel PoS chain that includes sharding. Development of the
block proposal mechanism on the PoS chain is ongoing, but
the stable parts of the protocol share similarities with ProPoS.
For example, it is also chain-based, with attestations taking
the place of votes in the fork-choice rule. Also, in the current
version of the spec, committees are selected by cryptographic
sampling using one of the techniques of [29].
Brown-Cohen et al. [12] analyze longest-chain PoS proto-
cols and show their fundamental limitations in preventing PoS-
specific attacks. For example, it formalizes local predictability,
allowing leaders in self-elected protocols efficiently predict
how long “secret” chains they can create. The paper reports
findings regarding multiple mentioned PoS schemes, including
Snow White and Ouroboros. These results do not directly
apply to our work, however. The chain selection in ProPoS
fully depends on votes (and not leader-driven chain length) and
on the employed GHOST-like rule which cannot be expressed
in the proposed framework (both these design choices are
admitted by the authors of this study as its limitations).
An adversary in ProPoS can try to create a secret branch
by predicting her voting stake in subsequent rounds. Our
methodology presented in § IV-A captures such attacks, and
as shown, even their stronger variants (with the worst-case
network split) have negligible success probability.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
In this work we have proposed ProPoS, a novel PoS
consensus protocol dedicated to cryptocurrencies. Surprisingly,
through its simple construction ProPoS provides a robust,
scalable, and secure consensus mechanism. Our scheme ex-
tends the notion of probabilistic safety, such that clients base
block commitment decisions on the probability of the block
being reverted given the total observed support for it. These
decisions are made more precise thanks to a lightweight
committee voting scheme that allows large numbers of nodes
to participate and express their beliefs about the blockchain.
In this work we have presented the core concept behind
ProPoS and its properties. In the future, we plan to extend
and analyze the system in a more dynamic setting and with
adaptive adversaries. In particular, we believe that the ideas
that are present in recent protocols [27], [18], [19] can be
successfully applied in ProPoS, enhancing the protocol further.
Another interesting research problem is to find an efficient
election protocol combining the advantages of the proposed
schemes (i.e., “secret” but deterministic election). We also plan
to study further economic aspects of the reward scheme and
their influence on the security of the system.
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APPENDIX A
CRYPTOGRAPHIC SAMPLING PROOF
We show that no probabilistic polynomial-time (PPT) ad-
versary can distinguish outputs of our cryptographic sampling
(see § III-C) from truly random sampling.
Definition 1 (Pseudorandom sampling). PRF is a pseudoran-
dom sampling and mapping {0,1}n×{0,1}s → {0,1}n if it
is collision-resistant and satisfies the following requirements:
1) For any k ∈ {0,1}s, PRF is a bijection from {0,1}n to
{0,1}n. 2) For any k∈{0,1}s, there is an efficient algorithm to
evaluate PRFk(x). 3) For all probabilistic PPT distinguishers
D:
|Pr(DPRFk(·)(1n) = 1)−Pr(D fn(1n) = 1)|< negl(s), (4)
where k← {0,1}n is chosen uniformly at random and fn is
chosen uniformly at random from the set of permutations on
n-bit strings.
Corollary 1. If the output of PRFr(·) is indistinguishable from
the uniform distribution, then the result of PRFr(·)%N for any
N is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution.
In particular, a pseudorandom sampling family is a collec-
tion of pseudorandom functions, where a specific sampling
may be chosen using a key as a salt.
Lemma A.1. We say that PRF is an unpredictable pseudo-
random sampling, if no PPT adversary can distinguish the
unit-pair from a uniform random distribution.
Proof. For all PPT distinguishers D :
|Pr(DPRFk(·)(1n) = 1)−Pr(D fn(1n) = 1)|< negl(s),
In other words, a PRF is any pseudorandom hash function
that can be used to map data of arbitrary size to data of fixed
size, and the above equation implies that if the PRF is secure,
then its output is indistinguishable from random output.
We define the following two distributions. X is the distri-
bution o1i ,o
2
i , · · · ,oSi , where o ji ← PRFrs
(
i‖role), and Y is the
uniform distribution. Then the two distributions X and Y are
computationally indistinguishable.
Below, we prove it by contradiction. We assume that D is
a PPT adversary who can distinguish X from Y with non-
negligible advantage. For 1 ≤ i ≤ S+ 1, S is the number of
stake units, we introduce intermediate distributions Xi that
are given by h
1
, · · · ,hi−1,hi, · · · ,hS, where hi is as above and
h
i
is uniformly chosen from Zq. Hence we obtain X1 =X
and XS+1 = Y .
By assumption, D can distinguish X1 from XS+1 = Y
with noticeable (or overwhelming) advantage ε and so, by
a standard hybrid argument, there is some i such that D can
distinguish Xi from Xi+1 with some noticeable advantage at
least ε/S.
It is then easy to see that D gives a distinguisher. That is,
Eq. 4 does not hold. By assumption, no such distinguisher
exists, and hence the lemma is proved.
Corollary 2. If the pseudorandom sampling distribution
PRFr(1‖role)‖· · ·‖PRFr(Q‖role)
is indistinguishable from the uniform distribution, then the
following sampling distribution
PRFr(1‖role) % Length(tmp1)‖· · ·
‖PRFr(Q‖role) % Length(tmpQ)
is indistinguishable from uniform, where tmpi for i ∈ [1,Q].
We remark that tmpi is dynamically changing for i ∈ [1,Q],
but it does not effect the indistinguishability result because
PRFr(i‖role) is pseudorandom, so PRFr(i‖role)%N is also
pseudorandom.
APPENDIX B
PROBABILITY COMPUTATION ALGORITHMS
Alg. 6 presents baseline implementations of the helper
functions needed to apply Alg. 4. They respectively compute
the logarithm of the binomial coefficient (LogBinCoef ), the
probability mass function of the hypergeometric distribu-
tion (HypergeometricPMF), the log of the Gaussian/ordinary
hypergeometric function (Hyp2F1), a suitable base interval
for golden-section search with RateFuncHelper as defined in
Alg. 4 (RateFuncSearchRange), and the new interval after a
step of golden-section search (or rather a variation that uses
two simpler mid points, for presentational simplicity). Hyper-
geometricPMF uses the logarithm of the binomial coefficient
to avoid floating-point errors during computation. The function
LogHyp2F1 computes the logarithm of 2F1(a,b,c,z), which is
defined as
2F1(a,b,c,z) =
∞
∑
n=0
(a)n(b)n
(c)n
zn
n!
where (x)n =∏n−1i=0 (x+ i) for n∈N and z∈R. It similarly uses
logarithms when possible in order to avoid numerical errors.
APPENDIX C
SAFETY ANALYSIS LEMMAS
The following lemma gives an expression for the probability
mass function of sums of hypergeometric random variables.
Lemma C.1. Let X1, . . . ,Xk be independent and identically
distributed, such that each Xi takes values on {0,1, . . . ,Q}.
Let Tk = ∑ki=1 Xi. Then
P(Tk = y) =
Q
∑
x2=0
Q
∑
x3=0
. . .
Q
∑
xk=0
k
∏
i=2
P(Xi = xi)P
(
X1 = y−
k
∑
i=2
xi
)
.
Proof. We prove this using mathematical induction. For the
base case, we have that
P(T2 = y) =
Q
∑
x2=0
P(X2 = x2)P(X1 = y− x2)
from the definition of the convolution of two random vari-
ables.10 For the induction step we have that
P(Tk = t) =
Q
∑
xk=0
P(Xk = xk)P(Tk−1 = t− xk)
=
Q
∑
xk=0
P(Xk = xk)
Q
∑
x2=0
Q
∑
x3=0
. . .
Q
∑
xk−1=0
k−1
∏
i=2
P(Xi = xi)P
(
X1 = t− xk−
k−1
∑
i=2
xi
)
=
Q
∑
x2=0
Q
∑
x3=0
. . .
Q
∑
xk=0
k
∏
i=2
P(Xi = xi)P
(
X1 = t−
k
∑
i=2
xi
)
,
where the first equality follows the definition of the convo-
lution of two random variables, the second equality is the
induction step, and the third equality holds because we are
10https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Convolution of probability distributions
Alg. 6: Helper functions.
1 function LogBinCoef(n,k)
2 x← 0; m←min(k,n− k);
3 for i ∈ {0, . . . ,m−1} do
4 x← x+ log(n− i)− log(m− i);
5 return x;
6 function HypergeometricPMF(S,M,Q,i)
7 x← LogBinCoef(M, i)−LogBinCoef(S−M,Q− i)
8 − LogBinCoef(S,Q);
9 return ex;
10 function LogHyp2F1(a,b,c,d)
11 x← 1; y← ∞; n← 1; r← 0;
12 // ε is an accuracy threshold set by the user
13 while ey+r < ε do
14 y← 0;
15 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,n} do
16 y← y+ log(−a− i+1)− log(−c− i+1)
+ log(−b− i+1)− log(i)+ log(z);
17 if y >−∞ then
18 k← byc; r← r+ k; x← xe−k + ey−k;
19 n← n+1;
20 return log(x)+ r;
21 function RateFuncSearchRange(S,M,Q,t)
22 ~λ ← (0,1,2,3);
23 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,4} do
24 yi← RateFuncHelper(S,M,Q,λi, t);
25 while y3 > y2 and y2 > y1 and y1 > y0 do
26 for i ∈ {1, . . . ,4} do
27 λi← 2∗λi; yi← RateFuncHelper(S,M,Q,λi, t);
28 return y3;
29 function ReduceInterval(~λ ,~y,S,M,Q,t)
30 // here, we require that imax = 4
31 if y1 > y2 then
32 λ3← λ2; λ2← 2/3∗λ3 +1/3∗λ0;
33 λ1← 1/3∗λ3 +2/3∗λ0;
34 else
35 λ0← λ1; λ1← 2/3∗λ0 +1/3∗λ3;
36 λ2← 1/3∗λ0 +2/3∗λ3;
37 return ~λ ;
allowed to interchange the summations (as they are all over a
finite set of elements). This proves the lemma.
The following lemma about the convexity of cX is needed
at two different points in the text (namely for the validity of
golden-section search, and for Lemma C.3). It is a well-known
result, but included here for completeness.
Lemma C.2. Let X be a random variable. Its cumulant-
generating function cX (λ ) = log(E(eλX )) is convex.
Proof. The lemma follows from a simple application of
Ho¨lder’s inequality.11 The proof is taken from Cosma Shalizi’s
11https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ho¨lder’s inequality
lecture notes on stochastic processes (week 31):12
cX (aλ +bµ) = logE
(
e(aλ+bµ)X
)
= logE
[(
eλX
)a (
eµX
)b]
≤ log
(
E
[(
eλX
)a] ·E[(eµX)b])
= acX (λ )+bcX (µ)
The following lemma shows that when the per-round sup-
porting stake is not greater than the expected value of our
distribution (which in our case is given by QU/S), then
we cannot establish a meaningful bound using the Crame´r-
Chernoff method. However, if it is greater than the expected
value, then the rate function is positive, which means that the
bound (and therefore the p-value) goes to zero as the number
of rounds increases.
Lemma C.3. Let X be a random variable. Then its large-
deviations rate function rX (t), defined as
rX (t) = sup
λ>0
(φt(λ )) = sup
λ>0
(λ t− cX (λ )),
has the following properties:
1) if t ≤ E(X), then rX (t) = 0, and
2) if t > E(X), then rX (t)> 0.
Proof. By definition, cX (0) = log(1) = 0. Hence, φt(0) = 0
for all t and therefore rX (t) ≥ 0. In the following, we will
investigate the derivative of φt(λ ) at λ = 0. If φ ′t (0)≤ 0, then
by the convexity of cX we know that φ ′t ≤ 0 for all λ > 0,
which proves property 1. However, if φ ′t (0) > 0 then there
must exist a point λ ∗ > 0 such that φt(λ ∗)> φt(0) = 0. Hence,
we can demonstrate both properties of the lemma using φ ′t (0).
φ ′t (λ ) =
d
dλ
(
λ t− log(E(eλX ))
)
= t−
d
dλ E(e
λX )
E(eλX )
because of the chain rule. Hence,
φ ′t (λ ) = t−
d
dλ E(e
λX )
E(eλX )
∣∣∣∣∣
λ=0
= t−E(X)
because E(e0) = 1, and ddλ E(e
λX )
∣∣
λ=0 = E(X) because of
the fundamental property of the moment-generating function13
that d
n
dnλ E(e
λX )
∣∣∣
λ=0
= E(Xn).
Obviously, if φ ′t (λ ) = t−E(X) then φ ′t (0)≤ 0 if t ≤ E(X)
and φ ′t (0)> 0 otherwise, which proves the lemma.
APPENDIX D
LIVENESS ANALYSIS LEMMAS
Lemma D.1. The main chain after t rounds includes at least
t(1− f )Q stake units while t increases.
Proof. While t increases, the expected number of “honest”
stake units elected per round is (1− f )Q. With the synchronous
network, honest nodes vote for the same blocks and their
12https://www.stat.cmu.edu/∼cshalizi/754/2006/
13https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Moment-generating function
votes are delivered on time. Thus, with the failing (not voting)
adversary, the strongest chain will obtain t(1− f )Q of the
supporting stake. An adversary can cause honest nodes to
change their current main chain e.g., by showing a stronger
fork, but according to our chain selection rule (§ III-D) such
a chain would need to contain at least the same amount of
supporting stake as their main chain. Thus, the final main chain
would include at least t(1− f )Q stake units.
Lemma D.2. With increasing t, the main chain after t rounds
includes n blocks that the honest participants voted for, where
t ≥ n≥ dt(1−2 f )e.
Proof. Following Lemma D.1, honest nodes after t would
agree on the main chain C that has at least t(1− f )Q stake
units. Let us assume that after t rounds there exists an
adversarial chain C′ with total stake of t f Q+ s, where t f Q is
adversarial stake and s is the stake shared between C and C′
(i.e., the chains have common blocks/prefix). C′ can overwrite
C only if: t f Q+s≥ t(1− f )Q, giving the bound for the shared
stake: s≥ t(1− f )Q−t f Q. As every block contains maximally
Q stake units, s can be contributed in minimum d t(1− f )Q−t f QQ e
blocks shared between C and C′. Thus, n≥ dt(1−2 f )e.
Note, that n is upper bound by t ≥ n, as the main chain
cannot contain more than t blocks in t rounds.
APPENDIX E
EXTENSIONS AND DISCUSSION
A. Equivocating Votes
As our protocol targets an open and permissionless envi-
ronment, we assume Byzantine nodes which can equivocate
by voting on conflicting views (e.g., for different blocks in
a given round). Although prevention of such misbehavior is
challenging, solutions that disincentivize it by causing the
misbehaving validator to lose all or parts of her deposit/stake
have been proposed [13]. We follow this approach: in ProPoS
a node is punished when a) she equivocates by voting for or
creating competing blocks in a round, or b) she (provably)
violates the chain selection rule, supporting or extending any
weaker chain after she previously supported or extended a
stronger chain. The former case is a nothing-at-stake attack and
it is easy to prove, just by showing two conflicting messages
produced by a malicious node. In the latter case, the goal is to
punish nodes not following the chain selection rule. However,
it is impossible to prove all cases of this misbehavior. For
instance, a misbehaving node can pretend that she does not see
the main chain branch and votes for a weaker chain instead.
Therefore, we focus only on provable misbehavior, i.e., when
there is undeniable evidence that a node violated the rule.
A found misbehavior is inserted into a special transaction
and added to the blockchain. Afterward, the finder receives a
special reward while the voting stake of the cheater is “burnt”.
Such a construction disincentivizes nodes from equivocating
and may incentivize all other nodes to report such misbehavior,
e.g., via the finder’s fee implemented in the Casper FFG
contract [14].
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Fig. 7: An example of the client’s view of the blockchain and possible
adversarial subtrees. (Percentage of a block denotes the stake directly
supporting this block.)
B. (D)DoS and Sampling-based Election
The main drawback of the introduced sampling-based elec-
tion (see § III-C) is that a leader and voters are known
at the beginning of the round. Thus it leaves a short time
window for an adversary to e.g., DoS a leader or voters before
they broadcast their messages (or conduct another adaptive
attack). We do not ignore this threat and propose its mitigation.
Namely, we propose that ProPoS in such a setting is combined
with a network-level anonymity solution. Fortunately, there
are multiple lightweight anonymity solutions available. For
instance, solutions like Dandelion [8], [24] are dedicated
to cryptocurrencies, providing formal anonymity guarantee,
low latency and overheads. Using such a solution together
with ProPoS would prevent an adversary from identifying
the node’s IP address, effectively preventing the mentioned
(D)DoS attack. (In App. E-E we also propose a VRF-based
election which prevents this kind of attacks.)
C. Block Commitment Example
To illustrate the block commitment process (§ III-E) better
we present a blockchain example in Fig. 7 where it holds
that Q = 110 S and a client wishes to commit the block C
which is on the main chain (denoted in blue). To overwrite
the block, an adversary would need to overwrite C’s or B’s
supporting subtree. However, since block B must have already
been committed, we do not need to consider any subtree
starting from A (although we show it in the figure). As
described, the client computes the p-value for the hypothesis
that more stake units contribute to the adversarial subtree than
to the supporting subtree under the worst-case conditions, and
commits if this is low enough.
In our case, if the client wishes to commit C, then the
adversarial subtree that could overwrite the supporting tree
directly originates from block B and has k = 4 potential
blocks, i.e., G,H, I,J. (We do not consider the topologies
of adversarial subtrees, as only the stake that they aggregate
decides their strengths.) The supporting subtree has 24% of the
stake. The missing stake in this case is 4 ·10%−24% = 16%.
However, the exact amount of missing stake that contributes
to an adversarial chain may depend on the random beacon
implementation (e.g., block J and the main chain block in
the same round may have different committees if the beacon
depends on some information in the blocks from the preceding
rounds). Hence, we do not use this information directly. To be
able to conclude with some degree of certainty that enough
stake units are supporting B, we need the supporting stake
to be comfortably above 23 kQ. If the calculated p-value is
acceptable for the client, the client commits B.
D. Stake Management
Current PoS systems suffer from the undesired “rich get
richer” dynamics [23]. In short, nodes with large stake hold-
ings obtain more stake from rewards (thus, more voting power)
and effectively quickly dominate the system. Although that
issue seems to be inherent to PoS systems, we propose to
divide stake into voting stake and transaction stake. The voting
stake would be used only for running the consensus protocol,
while transaction stake would be for conducting standard
cryptocurrency transactions. All rewards are paid in transaction
stake, and not in voting stake, which however, can be ex-
changed between nodes freely. With this simple modification,
the system does not make rich nodes richer automatically,
instead a market for the voting stake is introduced. The voting
stake can be transacted (to allow newcomer nodes), however,
we restrict that the voting right is granted only after the
transaction is confirmed by a significant number of blocks
such that its reversal probability is negligible.
A related issue is the voting stake that is not used for a
long time period. As the system has to be performant and
sustainable in the long-term, the traditional model of failures
may be insufficient as honest nodes can simply leave the
system due to other reasons than failures. The related work
suggests [13] a solution where the stake inactive for a long
time period may “expire” (as it may indicate that its owner lost
her keys or interests in supporting the platform). We believe
that a similar can be applied successfully with ProPoS.
E. Election via VRF
A verifiable random function (VRF) [35] allows for the
generation of a pseudorandom output from a message and
a secret key. The output can then be publicly verified by
any party with the corresponding public key. Algorand [27]
proposed a VRF-based method for committee and leaders
election dedicated to PoS systems. The core of the procedure
is the cryptographic sortition algorithm (see § 5 of [27]). Every
node runs the procedure locally to find out how many of its
stake units were sampled within the round. The likelihood of
Alg. 7: The voting procedure with VRF election.
1 function VotingRound(i)
2 r← RoundBeacon(i); w← stake[pk];
3 (h,pi,s)← Sort(sk,r,Q, ‘vote’,w,S); // Alg. 1 in [27]
4 if s > 0 then // check if I’m a voter
5 B−1←MainChain().lastBlk; // get last block
6 σ ← Signsk(i‖H(B−1)‖h‖pi‖s);
7 v← (i,H(B−1),h,pi,s, pk,σ); // support vote
8 Broadcast(v);
9 Wait(∆); // meantime collect and verify support votes
10 (h,pi,s)← Sort(sk,r,L, ‘lead’,w,S); // Alg. 1 in [27]
11 if s > 0 then // check if I’m a leader
12 B−1←MainChain().lastBlk; // possibly different block
13 V ←{va,vb,vc, ...}; // received B−1’s support votes
14 ri← Random();
15 σ ← Signsk(i‖ri‖H(B−1)‖F‖V‖Txs‖h‖pi‖s);
16 B← (i,ri,H(B−1),F,V,Txs,h,pi,s, pk,σ); // new block
17 Broadcast(B);
18 Wait(∆); // wait for the next round
19 function VerifyRole(r, role, pk, h, pi , s, size) // vrfy. leader/voter
20 w← stake[pk];
21 s′←Veri f ySort(pk,h,pi,r,size,role,w,S); // Alg. 2 in [27]
22 return s = s′;
being elected is proportional to the stake possession. This is
similar to our cryptographic sampling construction (§ III-C),
and Algorand’s sortition can be applied in ProPoS almost
directly, as we sketch below. The main voting procedure is
similar as previously, i.e., as in Alg. 7. The main difference is
to use the sortition algorithm to check whether the node is a
leader and voter in the round. Leaders and voters add proofs to
their blocks and votes, proving that they were indeed elected
in the given round. These proofs have to be checked by other
nodes by running VerifyRole.
The biggest advantage of this solution is that round voters
and leaders are unpredictable and become known only after
publishing their messages. This eliminates some classes of
adaptive attacks as an adversary cannot target nodes at the
beginning of the round. On the other hand, with such a
solution, Q and L are not constant and become random
variables instead. In particular, if X is the number of stake units
per round, then the variance in the hypergeometric distribution
as discussed in § IV is given by
Q
U
S
S−U
S
S−Q
S−1 .
By contrast, using VRFs every stake unit is chosen as part of
the committee with probability QS and part of the supporting
branch with probability US . Hence, the number of supporting
stake drawn using VRFs in a single round is binomial with
sample size S and probability U/S ·Q/S. The corresponding
variance is
S
UQ
S2
(
1−UQ
S2
)
.
The difference between these two quantities is illustrated in
Tab. II, which contains for different selections of S, Q, and
U the mean of X (which equals QU/S for both distributions),
the variances of the hypergeometric distribution (VarHPG) and
the binomial distribution (VarBIN), and the ratio of the latter
to the former. If we keep U/S constant at 23 , we see that the
variance increases as S or Q increases, but that Q has the
biggest impact. We observe that the variance of the binomial
distribution is consistently between 3 and 4 times larger than
for the hypergeometric distribution.
Tab. II: Means and variances of the two different probability distribu-
tions (hypergeometric and binomial) for X for different parameters.
S U Q mean VarHPG VarBIN ratio
150 100 15 10.0 3.02 9.33 3.09
150 100 75 50.0 8.39 33.33 3.97
1500 1000 75 50.0 15.84 48.33 3.05
15000 10000 75 50.0 16.58 49.83 3.0
1500 1000 750 500.0 83.39 333.33 4.0
15000 10000 2000 1333.33 385.21 1214.81 3.15
